What Effect Will Wal-Mart v. Dukes Have on Small Businesses? by Grimsley, Matthew
WHAT EFFECT WILL WAL-MART v. DUKES
HAVE ON SMALL BUSINESSES?
MATTHEW GRIMSLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The class action has long been a devastating weapon in the hands of the
plaintiffs' bar. While class actions are often a useful way to preserve
judicial economy and achieve institutional reform, in the eyes of many
businesses, class actions can open the door to frivolous litigation and
unjustified settlements.' For large corporations with adequate resources set
aside for settlement or litigation, class actions may be less of a concern.
However, for small businesses with fewer resources, a class action lawsuit
could potentially lead to their demise. 2 The Supreme Court's recent
decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes has assisted the defense bar by heightening
the requirements that must be met for a group of plaintiffs to be certified as
a class. However, although these requirements may be beneficial to large
corporate defendants, the same cannot be said for smaller businesses.
The purpose of this note is to analyze the effects that Dukes will have
on small businesses and how small businesses should respond. To do so,
Part II provides an overview of the class action rules. Part III discusses how
the Court interpreted those rules in Dukes. Part IV outlines how the Court's
decision will serve as precedent for both federal and state jurisdictions. In
Parts V and VI, the focus shifts to the impact that the decision will have on
Juris Doctor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2013.
'STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 878, 899 (8th ed. 2012).
2 Id.; 151 CONG. REC. 1664 (2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley) [hereinafter
Grassley] ("Unfortunately, the current class action rules are contributing to the cost
of business all across America, and it particularly hits small business because it is
the small business that gets caught up in the class action web without the resources
to fight."). The damages provision under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
of 1999 (TCPA) prohibits the sending of unsolicited advertisements to fax
machines and "has created a cottage industry of class action litigation spawning
professional plaintiffs and causing the demise of several businesses . . .. [U]sing
the TCPA as a basis for class actions against small businesses most likely will and
has led to devastating results." Med 1 Online, LLC's Reply Brief in Support of its
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff s Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) and in Opposition to the United States of America's
Memorandum in Support of the Constitutionality of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991 at 1, 5, Sadowski v. MedlOnline, 2007 WL 5025420 (N.D.
Ill. 2007) (No. 07-CV-2973)
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class litigation, particularly how it will benefit large corporations but not
small businesses, and then Part VII discuss whether this disproportionate
result will adversely affect the market for small businesses in the future.
Finally, Part VIII of this note offers various recommendations designed to
reduce the harm and the threat that class actions will pose under the current
class action model.
II. CLASS ACTIONS: AN OVERVIEW
A class action is a way for one or more parties to sue or be sued as
representative parties, on behalf of all those similarly situated.3 In other
words, a class action is a way for several parties in the same situation as a
result of a defendant's conduct to aggregate their claims against into one
lawsuit, as opposed to each filing individually. The class of plaintiffs will
often consist of employees, investors, customers or consumers. The
defendants are often the businesses and employers whose alleged conduct
harmed the class.
The usefulness of class litigation is subject to conflicting views. The
plaintiff's bar and public interest groups believe class actions are a way to
achieve institutional reform and ensure that businesses behave ethically and
comply with the law.4 Businesses, on the other hand, often view class
actions as "a dreadful scourge," forcing them to devote time and money to
frivolous litigation or settle meritless claims. Many believe class actions
are unfair, particularly in situations in which defendants are forced to settle
regardless of the claim's merits to avoid the threat of bankruptcy, should a
defendant lose in court.6 Furthermore, even if a business litigates and wins,
class actions can be extremely damaging to the business's finances and
reputation.! Congress has not remained silent on this issue and has
3 FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
4 YEAZELL, supra note 1, at 878.
5 Id.; see also Grassley, supra note 2, at 1664 ("Out-of-control frivolous filings are
a real drag on the economy. Many a good business is being hurt by this frivolous
litigation cost. Unfortunately, the current class action rules are contributing to the
cost of business all across America .... Too many good companies and consumers
are having to pay for this lawyer greed. Make no mistake about it, there is a real
impact on the bottom line for many of these companies and, to some extent, on the
economy as a whole. They have to eat this increased litigation cost or else it is
farmed out to consumers, such as you and me, and this is all in the form of higher
prices for goods and services we buy.").
6 YEAZELL, supra note 1, at 899.
7 Despite the fact that Wal-Mart prevailed in the Dukes case, its reputation was
damaged as soon as the class action was filed. See Winnie Chau, Note, Something
Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue and a Silver Sixpence
for her Shoe: Dukes v. Wal-Mart & Sex Discrimination Class Actions, 12
CARDozo J. L. & GENDER 969, 993-95 (2006) (noting that when the class action
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attempted to respond to these conflicting concerns with the passage of the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.8 However, the rule governing class
action procedures, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was
unaffected.
Whatever the concerns may be, Rule 23 requires plaintiffs to overcome
a few hurdles before a group can achieve class certification and go forward
with class action litigation. First, plaintiffs must satisfy four prerequisites:
numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy. Then, plaintiffs must
prove that their prospective class falls within one of the categories codified
in the Rule.
A. Rule 23(a) Prerequisites
In order to establish a case as a class action, the claims of the class
members must be encompassed by the claims of the named plaintiff.9 To
ensure this, Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
four preliminary requirements that the plaintiffs must satisfy in order to go
forward as a class: numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy or
representativeness.10
The "numerosity" requirement focuses on the size of the class. The
requirement is met if the class representative can show that the class is so
large that joinder of all members is impracticable." The "typicality"
requirement is met if the claims of the representative parties are
significantly similar to the claims of the class members.12 The "adequacy"
requirement is met if the representative parties will "fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class"l 3-that is, whether the named plaintiffs
and their attorneys are sufficiently qualified to serve as representatives of
the class. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the "commonality"
requirement mandates that the class members have "questions of law or fact
common to the class."' 4
The "commonality" requirement has been heavily litigated and is the
crux of the debate in Dukes.'5 This requirement "captures the idea that a
class should consist of persons who share characteristics that matter in
was initially brought against Wal-Mart, its reputation and image quickly began to
suffer).
8 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
9 YEAZELL, supra note 1, at 878.
'oId. at 878-79.
"FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
12 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
13 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(4).
14 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
1s YEAZELL, supra note 1, at 878.
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terms of the substantive law involved."l 6 However, what constitutes
"enough" to satisfy the commonality requirement was a question subject to
much debate until the Court reached its decision in Dukes, the focus of the
discussion infra Part III.
B. Rule 23(b) Class Category Requirements
Once the potential class has overcome the prerequisites set forth in Rule
23(a), the party seeking class certification must then show that the class
falls within one of the three class categories provided in Rule 23(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A Rule 23(b)(1) class ((b)(1) class) is established if different
adjudication with respect to individual class members would create
"incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class." 7 If a
class is certified as a (b)(1) class, any potential class members need not
receive notice or an opt-out right from the parties representing the class;
rather, the court may provide notice of the potential members'
involvement."
Plaintiffs may also seek certification under Rule 23(b)(2). A Rule
23(b)(2) class ((b)(2) class) primarily seeks injunctive or declaratory
relief.'9 To be a (b)(2) class, the party opposing the class must have acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class. 20 Civil rights
actions in which each class member has suffered from the same injury as a
result of the defendant's conduct will usually fall within this category.2 1
Like a (b)(1) class, if a class is certified under (b)(2), the class
representatives need not provide notice or an opt-out right to the class
members.22
Finally, if a group of plaintiffs cannot be certified as a (b)(1) or (b)(2)
class, a judge may still certify the plaintiffs as a Rule 23(b)(3) class ((b)(3)
class) if a class action is superior to other available methods of
adjudication.2 3 Rule 23(b)(3) acts as somewhat of a catchall provision to
preserve judicial efficiency. 24 Rule 23(b)(3) will generally encompass
claims seeking monetary damages.25 Common actions brought under Rule
6 id.
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2)(A) ("For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2),
the court may direct appropriate notice to the class.").
19 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).20 id
21 YEAZELL, supra note 1, at 880.
22 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
23 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
24 id
25 YEAZELL, supra note 1, at 880.
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23(b)(3) include mass torts and small claims cases.26 The most noteworthy
difference between a (b)(3) class and a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class is the
notification requirement. Unlike (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, plaintiffs seeking
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) must provide individual notice to every
prospective class member-including absentee class members-and such
notice must contain an opt-out provision.27 This requirement essentially
gives a prospective class member the option of handling the matter
individually, rather than allowing a collective group of plaintiffs to
determine his or her fate.
To summarize, a properly executed class action requires a prospective
class to first satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy
prerequisites under Rule 23(a). Once these requirements are satisfied, the
class must become certified as one of three types of classes under Rule
23(b). If the prospective class seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3), then
it must provide individual notice accompanied with an opt-out provision to
any prospective class member.28 After a prospective class gets past these
hurdles, it will generally be free to litigate as a class. Although the plain
language of these rules seems clear, they have been subject to rigorous
interpretation. In particular, the Court redefined the commonality
requirement and the applicability of Rule 23(b) certification in Dukes,2 9
which will be the main focus throughout the remainder of this note.
III. WAL-MART V. DUKES' INTERPRETATION OF RULE 23
In 2011, the Supreme Court gave new meaning to Rule 23 when
confronted with the largest employment class action lawsuit in history. The
case was Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and the Court's ruling heightens the
"commonality" requirement under Rule 23(a) and bars prospective classes
from certification under Rule 23(b)(2) if part of their complaint seeks
individualized monetary relief.30 The purpose of this section is to first
provide a brief factual description of the Dukes case. Then, it will address
26 id
27 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) ("For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the
court must direct to class members the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice must concisely and clearly state in plain,
easily understood language: (i) the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the
class certified; (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that a class member
may enter an appearance through counsel if the member so desires; (v) that the
court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, stating when
and how members may elect to be excluded; and (vi) the binding effect of a class
judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3).").28 id.
29 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550-52 (2011).
'o See id. at 2557-61.
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the Court's decision to heighten the commonality requirement. Finally, this
section will address the Court's decision to bar certification under Rule
23(b)(2) for actions seeking individualized monetary claims.
A. Factual Background
The case commenced when Betty Dukes and two others sought to
represent approximately 1.5 million current and former female Wal-Mart
employees in a class action against Wal-Mart.3 ' At the time of the case,
Wal-Mart was the nation's largest private employer with over one million
employees at approximately 3400 stores throughout the world.32 The group
of plaintiffs claimed that Wal-Mart engaged in sex discrimination by
denying female employees equal pay and promotions.33 Although Wal-Mart
did not have any discriminatory corporate policies in place, the plaintiffs
alleged that various local managers with discretionary authority over pay
and promotions engaged in discrimination against female employees.34 The
three named plaintiffs alleged that managers were exercising their
discretionary authority to disproportionately disfavor female employees.
As a result, the prospective class of plaintiffs sued for injunctive and
declaratory relief, punitive damages and back pay, and they moved to
certify as a (b)(2) class.36
B. Commonality Prerequisite
The main issue in Dukes was whether the plaintiffs satisfied the
prerequisites to become certified as a class. In particular, the crux of the
Court's inquiry involved whether the "commonality" prerequisite had been
met. To show commonality, the plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart fostered a
corporate culture that gave division managers discretionary decision-
making authority, allowing them to act on gender biases-thus making
every female employee a victim of a common discriminatory practice.37 To
prove this, the plaintiffs provided statistical and anecdotal evidence of sex
31 Id. at 2547-48.
32 Id. at 2547.
3 Id.
34 Id. at 2548.
3 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2548.
3 6 Id. at 2547, 2549.
n Id. at 2548 ("The basic theory of [the plaintiffs'] case is that a strong and
uniform 'corporate culture' permits bias against women to infect, perhaps
subconsciously, the discretionary decisionmaking of each one of Wal-Mart's
thousands of managers-thereby making every woman at the company the victim
of one common discriminatory practice.").
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disparity among employees and testimony of a sociologist who conducted a
"social framework analysis" of Wal-Mart's corporate culture.
In determining whether the commonality requirement had been met, the
Court noted that Rule 23(a) requires a "question[] of law or fact common to
the class."39 But in his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia heightened the
commonality requirement to require not just common questions among
class members but also the ability to provide common answers to issues
central to each class member's contention.4 In other words, in addition to
plaintiffs sharing the common question "why was I disfavored," there must
also be common answers to that question, such as an employment policy or
other workplace practice.4 1
In applying this new standard to deny class certification for lack of
commonality, Scalia wrote: "[T]he crux of [a Title VII] inquiry is 'the
reason for a particular employment decision,' . . . . Without some glue
holding the [plaintiffs'] alleged reasons for those decisions together, it will
be impossible to say that examination of all the class members' claims for
relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question."42 In other
words, Scalia's position states that to satisfy the common answer prong,
there must be some sort of "glue," such as an expressed corporate policy or
practice in place, that explains the alleged reasons for each employment
decision. Justice Scalia noted the fact that all Wal-Mart managers were
afforded discretion in making pay and promotion decisions and stated:
"[T]hat is just the opposite of a uniform employment practice that would
provide the commonality needed for a class action; it is a policy against
having uniform employment practices."A3
The Court also rejected the statistical and anecdotal evidence about
Wal-Mart's female employees and held that even if such evidence was
taken as "face value," "that would not demonstrate that the entire company
'operate[s] under a general policy of discrimination,' . . . . Merely showing
that Wal-Mart's policy of discretion has produced an overall sex-based
disparity does not suffice."" In short, the Court in Dukes heightened the
3 1 d. at 2549, 2553-54.
39 Id. at 2550-51; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).40 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550-52 ("[W]hat matters to class certification ... is not the
raising of common 'questions'-even in droves-but, rather the capacity of a
classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of
the litigation." (quoting Richard A. Nagarerda, Class Certification in the Age of
Aggregate Proof 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 97, 132 (2009))).
41 See id.
42 Id. at 2552 (quoting Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867,
876 (1984)).
43 Id. at 2554.
4 Id. at 2555-56 (quoting General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147, 159 (1982) (alteration in original)).
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commonality requirement by creating an additional prong. Although the
plain language of Rule 23(a)(2) only requires plaintiffs to show that all
members have common questions, as a result of Dukes, now plaintiffs must
also show common answers in order to receive class certification.
C. Class Category Requirements
After finding that the prospective class failed to satisfy the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites, the Court could have ended its inquiry. Nevertheless, the
Court also considered the Rule 23(b) class certification requirements and
concluded that the class was improperly seeking certification under Rule
23(b)(2). 45 The Court first noted that the plaintiffs' back pay claims were
"individualized monetary claims," not "incidental" to the class-wide
declaratory and injunctive claims.46 The Court then held that classes
seeking individualized monetary claims must proceed under the more
stringent requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).47 Unlike certification under Rule
23(b)(2), in order to be certified as a (b)(3) class, each class member must
receive notice and an opt-out right.48 The Court reasoned that an
opportunity must exist for "plaintiffs with individual monetary claims to
decide for themselves whether to tie their fates to the class representatives'
or go it alone-a choice Rule 23(b)(2) does not ensure that they have.A 9
Because the plaintiffs were seeking back pay that was not incidental to any
injunctive or declaratory relief, class certification under 23(b)(2) was
improper.
Overall, the Dukes Court made two major pronouncements regarding
class action litigation. First, and most notably, the plaintiffs must show not
only that common questions exist, but also common answers to those
questions at the perquisite stage, in order to satisfy the commonality
requirement under Rule 23(a)(2). Second, prospective class actions
45 Id. at 2558, 2561 ("[R]espondents' class could not be certified even assuming,
arguendo, that 'incidental' monetary relief can be awarded to a 23(b)(2) class.").
46 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557-59 ("If it were determined, for example, that a
particular class member is not entitled to backpay because her denial of increased
pay or a promotion was not the product of discrimination, that employee might be
collaterally estopped from independently seeking compensatory damages based on
that same denial.").
47 Id. at 2557 ("Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory
judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize
class certification when each individual class member would be entitled to
a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant. Similarly, it
does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to
an individualized award of monetary damages.").
48 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
49Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2559.
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containing individualized claims for monetary relief must be brought under
the more stringent standards of Rule 23(b)(3).o
TV. APPLICATION OF WAL-MART V. DUKES TO STATE COURTS
Dukes not only affects class actions at the federal level, but also at the
state level. Although Dukes is a landmark decision for federal jurisdictions,
many class action claims do not present federal questions or consist of
diverse citizenship with the requisite amount in controversy. Consequently,
such cases cannot properly be brought in federal court.5 ' Thus, a question
remains as to the impact of Dukes to class actions brought in state
jurisdictions. Recent trends suggest that states are beginning to follow suit.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure serves as a model rule
for states; the large majority of state class action statutes contain class
certification requirements that are either identical to or closely mirror the
52
requirements in Rule 23. In regard to the commonality requirement in
particular, all but two states, North Carolina and Mississippi, have similar
commonality language codified in their statutes.53 As a result, the Court's
interpretation of Rule 23 will likely have a strong influence on how state
courts interpret their class action rules.54 In fact, several state courts have
begun applying Dukes when determining whether to grant class
certification. An Ohio Court of Appeals, in particular, recently applied the
Dukes heightened commonality requirement when confronted with
consumer class action lawsuits in Cullen v. State Farm and Perme v. Union
sold. at 2557-61.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States."); id. § 1332(a) (requiring all class representatives to be citizens of different
states than all defendants and at least one plaintiff to have over $75,000 "in
controversy"); id. § 1332(d)(2) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which-(A) any
member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant. . . .").
52 Thomson-Reuters/West, 50 State Statutory Surveys, Class Action Requirements,
0020 Surveys 2 (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter 50 State Surveys]; 2011 Year-End Update
on Class Actions, GBsON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, Jan. 30, 2012, at 7.
5 50 State Surveys, supra note 52.
54 GusoN, DuNN & CRUTCHER LLP, supra note 52 ("Because Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a) often serves as a guide for analogous state class certification
rules, Dukes' should have a significant impact on state class certification
decisions.").
ss Id. ("[S]everal state courts already have applied Dukes in assessing state-law
class certification issues.").
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Escrow, and held that commonality existed.56 The Supreme Court of
Louisiana also grappled with the heightened commonality requirement from
Dukes in Price v. Martin when it rejected certification for failure to provide
common evidence. In addition, a California Court of Appeals in Duran v.
U.S. Bank National Ass'n applied Dukes to decertify a class consisting of
employees alleging violations of wage and hour laws.s Similar to Dukes, in
Duran, the court held that statistical data was not sufficient to establish
commonality. 59
Therefore, because states are already beginning to follow suit,
regardless of whether diversity or a federal question exists, the Dukes
formula will likely filter its way to state courts.
V. THE IMPACT OF WAL-MART V. DUKES: A VICTORY FOR LARGE
CORPORATIONS
The Court's decision to heighten the commonality requirement and to
bar prospective classes seeking individualized monetary relief from
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) was a victory for large corporate
defendants, particularly in the context of employment class actions. It was a
victory because it has heightened the hurdles for plaintiffs to proceed as a
class. As a result, there will be fewer class action threats, and large
corporations will likely spend substantially less time and money on
litigation.
A. Fewer Class Action Threats
Dukes will inevitably reduce the number of class action threats against
large corporations. In fact, within the six months after the Supreme Court
rendered its decision, hundreds of courts across the nation began to apply
56 Cullen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2011-Ohio-6621, 970 N.E.2d 1043,
56 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011); Perme v. Union Escrow Co., 2012-Ohio-3448, Nos.
97368, 97381, 2012 WL 3133239, $T 12, 24 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2012).
5 Price v. Martin, 2011-0853, pp. 10-14 (La. 12/6/11); 79 So. 3d 960, 969-71
(applying Dukes heightened commonality requirement to bar class certification
because plaintiffs failed to come forward with common evidence of "a causal
connection between specific emissions and damage to the class member's
property").
58 Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 391, 435-43 (Cal. Ct. App.),
rev'd, 275 P.3d 1266 (Cal. 2012).
59Id. at 442-43 ("Here, the trial court attempted to manage the individual issues in
the first phase of this trial by resorting to an unproven statistical sampling
methodology that denied USB the right to properly defend the claims against it. As
we have demonstrated, the plan fell short. Accordingly, we conclude the failure to
grant USB's second motion to decertify was an abuse of discretion.").
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the Dukes formula to deny class certification.60 Because of the heightened
commonality requirement and the inability to seek certification under Rule
23(b)(2) for monetary claims, class actions against large corporations will
be less of a threat and less frequent.
The heightened commonality requirement in particular will result in
fewer class action threats, more certification denials and smaller class sizes
seeking certification. 6 ' For one, the ability to provide common contentions
against large corporations is already difficult. Prospective classes seeking to
sue large corporations will often consist of a large number of members. The
more prospective class members, the greater the likelihood that an
inconsistency will exist among their contentions.
Furthermore, assuming that the plaintiffs do possess common
contentions, Dukes requires plaintiffs to prove that common answers exist,
such as an expressed corporate policy or practice.6 2 Because large
corporations tend to operate across a large geographical scope with various
regional managers, the ability to prove that every particular division and
every particular regional manager is operating under the same objective
corporate policy will be extremely difficult and require significant
discovery. 63 Also, if large corporations take heed of Dukes and allocate
independent discretionary authority to division managers-permitting each
individual division to engage in its own subjective practices-then common
answers will likely not exist. Without evidence of a common corporate
practice or policy to "glue" their contentions together, plaintiffs will be
unable to satisfy the common answer prong.6 Also, even if evidence can be
60 GIBsON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, supra note 52, at 2 ("Courts nationwide have
taken heed of Dukes, citing it widely both as a general guide for evaluating class
certifications and, most significantly, as the basis for denying certification or
decertifying in more than a hundred cases in the past six months alone."); Melissa
Lipman, Plaintiffs Bar Reboots Class Strategy in Wake of Dukes, LAw360 (Jan. 9,
2012), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/298335/plaintiffs-bar-reboots-class-
strategy-in-wake-of-dukes ("From the time the much-watched decision came down
in June until the end of 2011, courts have cited the ruling tightening the standards
for class certification more than 260 times . ... Judges have either denied
certification or decertified previous classes in roughly two-thirds of those
cases . . ."); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557-61
(2011).
61 See Dr. Mary Dunn Baker, Class Certification Statistical Analyses Post-Dukes,
27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 471, 481 (2012).
62 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550-52.
63 John M. Husband & Bradford J. Williams, Wal-Mart v. Dukes Redux: The
Future of the Sprawling Class Action, 40 COLO. LAW. 53, 55 (2011) ("The Dukes
decision's likely effects on employers include fewer unmeritorious cases being
filed, because plaintiffs' attorneys now will have to invest significant resources in
discovery before moving for certification.").
64See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550-52.
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uncovered through extensive discovery, the cost of discovery itself may be
so impracticable that it deters plaintiffs from proceeding as a class. 65
Finally, given the difficulty in proving both common contentions and
common answers among large classes, any remaining class actions against
large corporations will likely be smaller and thus less of a threat.66
In addition, the Court's decision in Dukes to bar certification under
Rule 23(b)(2) for claims seeking individualized monetary relief will also
serve as an advantage for large corporate defendants. Plaintiffs that wish to
obtain individualized monetary relief now must either drop these
individualized monetary claims or attempt to certify as a class under Rule
23(b)(3), which requires that individual notice and opt-out rights be given
to all prospective class members.67 Because class actions against large
corporations include many prospective class members, several of whom
will be absentees, plaintiffs suffer from the burden of identifying and
individually notifying every potential member. This burden, coupled with
the heightened commonality requirement, is likely to deter plaintiffs from
proceeding as a class. Therefore, both the heightened commonality
requirement and the preclusion of Rule 23(b)(2) certification for classes
with individualized monetary claims will reduce the threat of class actions
to large corporations and will result in fewer class actions against large
corporations.
B. Saving Large Corporations Money
In addition to fewer class actions, the Dukes decision will allow large
corporations to reduce their legal expenses. In fact, numerical data suggests
that large corporations are already beginning to save money as a result of
the Dukes decision.68 This ability to save money likely stems from two
sources: by devoting fewer resources to legal departments and engaging in
subjective employment practices that reduce expenses associated with
employee wages.
1. Saving Money by Devoting Fewer Resources to Litigation
Fewer class actions will allow large corporations to devote fewer
resources to litigation. As previously noted, class action litigation can be
65 See Husband & Williams, supra note 63.
66 Baker, supra note 61, at 480-81 (noting that the Dukes decision should limit the
size of class actions); see also Lipman, supra note 60.
67 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557-61.
68 'Dramatic Halo Effect' of Wal-Mart Ruling Seen Spurring Change in Workplace
Suits, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 18, 2013) ("The top 10 settlements [in employment
discrimination litigation] in 2012 totaled $48.65 million, a sharp decline from 2010,
the year prior to Dukes, when the total was $346.4 million.").
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very expensive, particular in federal courts where the amount in
controversy will exceed $5,000,000.69 With the heightened commonality
requirement making it more difficult to bring class actions, plaintiffs will
instead have to file lawsuits individually. The benefits of this are threefold.
First, without the class action rules, many individuals will not receive
notice that they possess a common claim and will fail to bring it. Second,
even if individuals receive notice, they now will have to devote resources of
their own to litigation. Finally, large corporations tend to be much more
successful in suits against individuals where they can take advantage of
economies of scale.
Without the class action rules in play, individuals may never receive
notice that they possess a claim. As noted in Part II, Rule 23(c) requires the
representative party in a (b)(3) class seeking monetary relief to provide
prospective class members with notice that a class action is being filed and
of the claims that are being asserted, among other things.70 Conversely, for
classes certified under (b)(1) or (b)(2), a court may give notice to
prospective class members.n When class actions are brought, prospective
parties will likely be notified that they have a valid claim. However, with
fewer class action filings as a result of Dukes, fewer individuals will receive
notice of existing class action claims. Without such notice, many parties
may never become aware that they individually have a valid claim and will
fail to bring it without the proactive action of other class members.
In addition, class actions are a means for prospective class members to
join in a lawsuit without having to devote their own personal resources to
litigation. Because it is now more difficult to bring class actions against
large corporations, plaintiffs will have to file suits individually and will
have to devote resources of their own to do so. This will indefinitely deter
some parties from filing suit, particularly the parties that lack the resources
to initiate a lawsuit. Furthermore, even if an individual does file suit, he or
she may not have the resources to conduct the necessary discovery and
compile sufficient evidence to satisfy the burden of proof, whether at trial
or to survive a later motion for summary judgment.
Finally, even if individual plaintiffs bring their claims in court, the
likelihood of success is significantly less than if the plaintiffs joined
together in a class action. According to one study, class actions brought for
claims challenging the subjective practices of employers have a success rate
of 27% to 29%.72 Meanwhile, when individuals bring claims challenging
69 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
70 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
n See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
72 Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing A Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-
Martfor Cases Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 433, 457 (2012).
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the subjective practices of employers, the success rate is only 2% to 5%.73
According to Professors Hay and Rosenberg, by forcing plaintiffs to litigate
their common claims individually, "a defendant facing a large number of
plaintiffs generally has an enormous, and unwarranted, upper hand over the
plaintiffs. The defendant firm, but not the plaintiffs, can take advantage of
economies of scale in case preparation, enabling it to invest far more cost-
effectively in the litigation."7 4 Therefore, even if an individual plaintiff
believes that he or she may have a valid claim, but does not have the
resources to adequately litigate that claim in court, the likelihood of the
plaintiff succeeding on said claim is significantly less than it would have
been had he or she joined a group of plaintiffs and been able to satisfy the
class certification requirements.
Overall, making it more difficult to bring class actions may not only
result in fewer class actions, but also in fewer individual actions, thus
reducing the resources a business may need to devote to litigation.
Furthermore, even if individuals bring actions, they are significantly less
likely to succeed on their claims. All of these facts will inevitably permit
corporations to devote fewer resources to their legal departments in favor of
strengthening their infrastructure to better compete in the market.
2. Saving Money Through Subjective Employment Practices
In addition to reducing litigation expenses, as a result of the Dukes
decision, large corporations can also save money by engaging in subjective
employment practices to reduce expenses associated with employee wages.
Under the Dukes criteria, so long as large corporations do not have an
expressed corporate policy of discrimination, they may be able to deny
promotions and engage in certain employment practices to save money
without fear of class action litigation.7 5 As noted, to satisfy the heightened
commonality requirement under the Dukes formula, resolution of the case
must be able to provide "common answers" that will "glue" together the
common questions, such as an expressed objective policy that results in
discrimination.76 In Dukes, the Court noted that giving regional and district
managers discretion to use their own judgment is the exact opposite of an
objective corporate policy that would suffice to satisfy the "common
"Id.
74 Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in
Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1377, 1379 (2000).
7s See discussion supra Part III.B. Companies could, however, still be subject to
disparate impact litigation if the grant of discretionary authority resulted in the
same "effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination."
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011).
" Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 ("The whole point of permitting discretionary
decisionmaking is to avoid evaluating employees under a common standard.").
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answer" prong.n Thus, when claims are based on subjective employment
practices alone, the ability to provide common answers will be difficult, if
not impossible.
In its appellate brief for the plaintiffs in Dukes, the National
Employment Lawyers Association noted that "[i]f claims involving
objective criteria are easier to certify than those involving subjective
criteria, the likely result is that employers will move further away from
objective measures of job performance, skills, or qualifications." Thus,
under this view, Dukes opens the door for corporations to subjectively
discriminate against individuals, whether regarding wages or promotions,
because of the difficulty in establishing the heightened commonality
requirement for such claims. All corporations must do is remove objective
policies, possibly by giving individual discretionary authority to regional
managers as did Wal-Mart in Dukes.79 Then, they are free to deny
promotions and reduce employee wages without fear of class litigation.so
Overall, Dukes was a substantial victory for large corporations. As a
result of the Court's decision, large corporations will face fewer class action
threats and be able to save money by devoting fewer resources to legal
departments and engaging in subjective business practices.
n Id. at 2547 ("Admission to Wal-Mart's management training program, however,
does require that a candidate meet certain objective criteria, including an above-
average performance rating, at least one year's tenure in the applicant's current
position, and a willingness to relocate. But except for those requirements, regional
and district managers have discretion to use their own judgment when selecting
candidates for management training. Promotion to higher office-e.g., assistant
manager, co-manager, or store manager-is similarly at the discretion of the
employee's superiors after prescribed objective factors are satisfied."). Justice
Scalia noted the fact that all Wal-Mart managers were afforded discretion in
making pay and promotion decisions and stated: "[T]hat is just the opposite of a
uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality needed for a
class action; it is a policy against having uniform employment practices." Id. at
2554.
78 Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Lawyers Association et al. in
Support of Respondents at 14-15, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011) (No. 10-277).
' Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
80 In addition, individual actions against large corporations that engage in
subjective business practices will also be less of a threat given the low success rate
of individuals when challenging the subjective practices of employers (only 2% to
5%). Tippett, supra note 72.
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VI. IMPACT OF WAL-M4ART V. DuKES: A VICTORY FOR SMALL
BUSINESSES?
While Dukes may have been a victory for large corporations, the same
cannot be said for small businesses. In particular, the heightened
commonality requirement provides no assistance to small businesses for
four reasons. First, most small businesses are not large enough to have
various divisions with managers to whom discretionary authority can be
allocated. Second, in small business class actions, class sizes are much
smaller, making it easier to establish commonality. Third, with regard to
employment class actions, many small businesses do not employ enough
people to make up a class that will satisfy the "numerosity" requirement,
thus making Dukes irrelevant.81 Fourth, small businesses have fewer
resources to utilize when disproving commonality and may be forced to
settle even before the class certification stage. In addition, the requirement
that individualized monetary claims be brought under the more stringent
standards of Rule 23(b)(3) is of little benefit because small business class
actions consist of a relatively few number of members, thereby reducing the
significance of the notification requirement.
A. Less Opportunity to Allocate Discretionary Authority
Unlike large corporations, such as Wal-Mart, small businesses do not
have various divisions with local managers to whom they can allocate
discretionary authority. This is significant because the Dukes Court's
reasoning was based in part on the conclusion that the allocation of
discretionary authority to local managers was "just the opposite of a
uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality needed
for a class action." 82 The Court noted that given the size and geographic
scope of Wal-Mart, many different managers across the globe could not
each exercise their discretion in a common way without a uniform policy
directing them to do so. 83 Small businesses also do not encompass a
significantly large geographic scope. Thus, small businesses do not have the
opportunity to use allocation of discretionary authority as a tool to defend
themselves in class certification battles. Furthermore, without subjective
practices of various managers to cloud a common answer, plaintiffs will
need to invest very little in discovery. Consequently, businesses will also
lose the deterrent power of costly discovery.
81 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued
as representative parties on behalf of all members only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable . . .
82 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
83 Id. at 2555 ("In a company of Wal-Mart's size and geographical scope, it is quite
unbelievable that all managers would exercise their discretion in a common way
without some common direction.").
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B. Smaller Classes Make it Easier to Satisfy Commonality
Unlike Wal-Mart and other large corporations, class actions against
small businesses will consist of a substantially smaller number of class
members. To recall, the prospective class of plaintiffs in Dukes consisted of
roughly 1.5 million current and former employees." Meanwhile, 99.7% of
the rest of the employers in the United States employ fewer than 500
employees. Thus, even if the largest company within that 99.7% is subject
to a class action and every employee joins in the action, there will be fewer
class members among which to show that common contentions exist than
the 1.5 million plaintiffs in Dukes. With fewer class members, the
likelihood that an inconsistency will exist among the prospective class
members' contentions is reduced, making it easier for plaintiffs' attorneys
to satisfy the commonality requirement.
C. Employment Class Actions Exist Despite Fewer Employees
In addition, because the "numerosity" prerequisite under Rule 23(a)(2)
only permits class actions where the class is so large that a joinder would be
"impracticable," 86 smaller businesses that employ a relatively few number
of employees will likely never be subject to an employment class action.
Instead, the class may consist of consumers. Consumer class action claims
pertain to mass torts, such as a product defect or misleading
advertisement. In these types of class actions, it will likely be significantly
easier to satisfy the heightened commonality requirement because the
common "product defect" or the "dangerous drug" will be expressed and
physically identifiable, which will provide the common answer that was
missing in Dukes. 8 Had the plaintiffs in Dukes been able to point to an
"expressed" corporate policy to serve as a common answer, they would
have been able to satisfy the commonality prerequisite under Rule 23(a).
84 Id. at 2547.
85 Tippett, supra note 72, at 474 ("Employers with less than 500 employees
represent 99.7 percent of all employers in the United States, a class size much more
likely to survive the more exacting standards set forth in Wal-Mart." (footnote
omitted)).86 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(2).
87 Common Types of Class Action Lawsuits, LAW INFO (July 2010), http://resources.
lawinfo.com/en/articles/class-action/federal/common-types-of-class-action-
lawsuits.html.
88 See, e.g., In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 678
F.3d 409, 418-21 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying Dukes in a product liability class action
and holding that the commonality requirement was satisfied because the plaintiffs
Presented evidence of a common design flaw).
9 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011).
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Where a defective product or misleading advertisement is the basis of the
class action, for example, the common answer is much more clear.
D. Small Businesses Have Fewer Resources
In addition, because small businesses have significantly fewer financial
resources than large corporations, many may be unable to conduct the
necessary discovery to defend themselves against class certification. As a
result of the Dukes heightened commonality requirement, lower courts, as
gatekeepers, will have to conduct a more rigorous analysis during the class
certification stage. 90 This may require both plaintiffs and defendants to
devote more resources to attorneys, courts and discovery in order to prove
or disprove commonality. Large corporations like Wal-Mart have the
resources to devote to defend against class certification and disprove
commonality. Small businesses, on the other hand, have fewer resources
with which to do the same.91 Furthermore, even after the class certification
stage, small businesses will still have fewer resources to defend against
class action claims at trial. Therefore, if small businesses do chose to
litigate, Dukes is of little assistance.
In a similar vein, oftentimes it may cost small businesses more to
defend against class certification than it would cost to simply settle.92 Thus,
even if a prospective class brings meritless claims, small businesses may
still be forced to pay large settlements if they cannot afford to defend
against class certification. Therefore, to avoid incurring additional costs
associated with litigation and attorney fees, small businesses may decide to
informally settle matters. In that case, Dukes is completely irrelevant.
E. Fewer Absentee Members Make Rule 23(b)(3) Easier to Satisfy
The Court's decision in Dukes to bar plaintiffs with individualized
claims for monetary relief from seeking class certification under Rule
23(b)(2) will also have little benefit-if any-to small business defendants.
90 Hot Topic Labor & Employment Law News: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et
al., AM. B. Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/groups/labor law/ll_
hottopics/201 Iaball hottopics/ 1 _aball wal mart stores incvdukesetal.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2013) ("The Wal-Mart decision . . .. [S]tresses the
importance of the lower courts' gatekeeping function and the rigorous analysis
required at the class certification stage. It is not enough to identify a general
common question; rather, plaintiffs need to identify and advance 'significant proof
of 'a specific employment practice' that 'ties' their class together and for which
there are 'common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation."').
9 Grassley, supra note 2.
92 Cf YEAZELL, supra note 1, at 880 (discussing mass tort claims).
9 Dukes is irrelevant if small businesses choose to settle through other, informal
means in which precedent and the Rules of Civil Procedure are inapplicable.
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The Court in Dukes held that prospective classes seeking individualized
monetary relief can only receive class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).94
Moreover, classes seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3) must satisfy the
strict notice requirements under Rule 23(c)(2)(B).9 5 As discussed infra Part
V, this is beneficial to large corporations because the potential class actions
they face consist of large classes with numerous absentee class members
across a large geographical scope. Requiring plaintiffs to provide individual
notice to each and every class member burdens the plaintiffs bar and
discourages large class action lawsuits.96 On the other hand, class actions
against small businesses will consist of significantly fewer class members,
particularly absentee class members. Thus, the burden of satisfying the
strict notice requirements for classes with individualized monetary claims is
not nearly as significant for class actions brought against small businesses.
Overall, Dukes was not a victory for small businesses. First, the
heightened commonality requirement is of little benefit; it will have a
minimal impact on the number of class actions and the manner in which
class actions are brought against small businesses. Second, the heightened
commonality requirement may adversely impact small businesses by
forcing them to settle even unmeritorious claims as a result of inadequate
resources to litigate. In addition, the Court's decision requiring plaintiffs
with monetary claims to satisfy the strict notice standards does not
meaningfully burden plaintiffs in class actions against small businesses.
Therefore, although Dukes was a victory for large corporations, the same
cannot be said for small businesses.
VII. WILL THE WAL-MA4RT v. DUKES DECISION PUT SMALL
BUSINESSES AT AN UNFAIR DISADVANTAGE IN THE MARKET?
Although Dukes may not adversely affect the number of class actions
brought against small businesses, the decision may indirectly result in an
unfair disadvantage for small businesses in the market. Though not a
complete loss, Dukes was certainly not a victory for small businesses. It
was, however, a victory for large corporations: whether benefiting large
corporations and not small businesses will put small businesses at an unfair
disadvantage is subject to debate. The purpose of this Part is to address
potential arguments on both sides of the debate and permit readers to draw
their own conclusions.
94 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
9 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring that classes certified under Rule
23(b)(2)(3) to provide individualized notice to all prospective class members,
including the opportunity to opt-out).
96 See discussion supra Part V.
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A. Small Businesses Will Be Unfairly Disadvantaged
One way to view the impact of Dukes may be to consider it as a form of
"robbing from the poor and giving to the rich." Prior to Dukes, large
corporations already had the advantage of economies of scale and were
better equipped to compete in the market. Dukes will only strengthen this
advantage because it will likely provide access to additional capital for
large corporations, while small businesses will be left in the same position
as before.
Because Dukes significantly raised the bar for plaintiffs to successfully
obtain class certification, large corporations will face fewer class actions
and likely fewer individual actions.97 As a result, large corporations now
have the luxury of devoting fewer resources to their legal departments.
Dukes essentially opened the door for large corporations to cut employee
wages and reduce employee promotions as long as the practice of doing so
is subjective and not expressed.99 With the ability to reduce legal expenses
and possibly even the expenses associated with employees, large
corporations will likely have additional capital on hand. With additional
capital, large corporations may be able to afford to reduce the costs of their
products or services and invest in marketing, technology or other market
share growth opportunities.'00
Meanwhile, Dukes does not provide the same opportunities for small
businesses. Unlike large corporations, small businesses will continue to
face class action threats at the same rate and possibly even at a greater rate
than before. If class action attorneys for plaintiffs are unsuccessful at
pursuing large corporations, they may pursue instead the market for small
businesses at higher rates. 01 Therefore, unlike large corporations-which
9 Fewer class actions will likely lead to more individual filings. Hay & Rosenberg,
supra note 74.
98 See id. at 1384.
99 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 ("The whole point of permitting discretionary
decisionmaking is to avoid evaluating employees under a common standard.").
100 See Grassley, supra note 2 ("Make no mistake about it, there is a real impact on
the bottom line for many of these companies and, to some extent, on the economy
as a whole. They have to eat this increased litigation cost or else it is farmed out to
consumers, such as you and me, and this is all in the form of higher prices for
goods and services we buy."). Senator Grassley's statements highlight the high
costs to businesses and consumers alike from class action lawsuits, and "frivolous"
class actions in particular. Id.
'' It will likely be easier to satisfy the Dukes standard when class actions are
brought against small businesses because such class actions will consist of smaller
class sizes. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. This may in some way
encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to bring class actions against small businesses at
higher rates, given the difficulty in bringing class actions against large corporations
as a result of Dukes.
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already have economies of scale to their advantage-small businesses will.
not have access to additional capital and will be further disadvantaged in
the market. In sum, because the Dukes decision will allow large
corporations to devote fewer resources to legal departments and engage in
subjective employment practices, it is plausible to suggest that because
small businesses do not have these same advantages large corporations will
be at an unfair advantage in the market.
B. The Disadvantages May Be Minimal and Temporary
Small businesses may not be entirely disadvantaged by Dukes,
however. A contrary argument exists that the impact of Dukes on the
market for small businesses will be minimal and only temporary. First, the
impact of Dukes on the market for small businesses may be minimal;
although the heightened commonality requirement from Dukes will likely
have a significant impact on large employment class actions, the same may
not be true when class actions are brought by consumers or investors.
Employment class actions involve claims based on civil rights violations by
employers, such as sexual harassment, discriminatory hiring, discriminatory
pay, hostile work environments and retaliation. 0 2 As illustrated in Dukes, it
will be more difficult to satisfy the heightened commonality requirement
when the class action is based on employment practices because it may be
difficult to prove an apparent corporate policy to serve as a "common
answer." On the other hand, securities class actions consist of claims for
security law violations and predatory lending, whereas consumer class
actions claims pertain to mass torts such as product defects, dangerous
drugs or misleading advertisements and warnings.103 For claims of these
types, large corporations may not be able to use subjectivity to cloud
commonality. For example, plaintiffs need only present evidence of a
common design flaw or misleading warning label in order to satisfy
commonality in a products liability class action lawsuit.'" Such evidence
will likely be apparent and easily obtainable. Therefore, the heightened
commonality requirement may have a significant impact only on
employment class actions.
Furthermore, some evidence suggests that employment class actions
have become less prevalent against large corporations.'05 Many
102 Common Types of Class Action Lawsuits, supra note 87.
"0See, e.g., In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 678
F.3d 409, 418-21 (6th Cir. 2012).
105 See Brief of Amici Curiae, Law and Economics Professors in Support of
Respondents at 8, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-
277). But see 'Dramatic Halo Effect' of Wal-Mart Ruling Seen Spurring Change in
Workplace Suits, supra note 68 ("The report found that wage and hour litigation
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employment class actions are based on civil rights violations; as in Dukes,
and even prior to Dukes, civil rights class actions were on the decline in
absolute numbers and constituted a relatively small percentage of total class
action filings.' 06 Specifically, the total number of class actions brought for
civil rights violations in the first half of 2007 decreased 17% from the
second half of 2001.107 Also, by the first half of 2007, "[c]ivil rights class
actions constituted only 6.9 percent of total class action filings and
removals. . . ."os Thus, because civil rights class actions are primarily
brought for employment discrimination, the decline in civil rights class
actions prior to Dukes indicates a decline in employment class actions prior
to Dukes.109 Therefore, if the heightened commonality requirement only has
a significant impact on employment class actions and if employment class
actions are less prevalent than other types of class actions, then the
advantages of the heightened commonality requirement for large
corporations may be minimal overall.
In addition, one could argue that the disproportionate advantages that
Dukes provides for large corporations will only be temporary. As more
prospective classes are denied certification, attorneys will likely search for
new strategies to overcome the Dukes standard. One strategy may be to cut
back on nationwide class actions directed at an entire corporate practice and
instead file smaller regional class actions confined to a single corporate
division or facility."o In doing so, there would likely be fewer class
members; thus, like small business class actions, it would be easier for
plaintiffs to show consistency among their claims. In addition, by focusing
on one particular corporate facility or operation, there would likely be fewer
managers with discretionary authority, which could in turn hinder a large
outpaced all other types of workplace class actions in 2012, with a total of 7,672
Fair Labor Standards Act suits filed last year. That represented an increase of 893
from the then-record 2011 levels.").
106 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae, Law and Economics Professors in Support of
Respondents, supra note 105; EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE
IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS 5
(2008) ("[C]ivil rights class actions declined in absolute numbers, from 195 in
July-December 2001 to 162 in January-June 2007, a decrease of 17 percent. Civil
rights class actions constituted 6.9 percent of total class action filings and removals
in January-June 2007, compared with 14.2 percent in July-December 2001.").
107 LEE & WLLLGING, supra note 106.
109 Brief of Amici Curiae, Law and Economics Professors in Support of
Respondents, supra note 105 ("Thus, the decline in civil rights cases represents not
only a conservative estimate for the decline in civil rights class certifications but,
more important, the waning of employment discrimination class action
certifications, a subset of all civil rights certifications.").
n0 SEYFARTH SHAw LLC, ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
REPORT 9 (2012).
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corporation's ability to cloud common answers. Therefore, even if Dukes
does create a disadvantage for small businesses, the disadvantages that
small businesses face may be only minimal and temporary.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SMALL BUSINESSES
Regardless of whether Dukes will put small businesses at an unfair
disadvantage, a number of options are available that will protect small
businesses from class action threats. This Part provides recommendations
that will assist small businesses in avoiding class action litigation and the
threats that class actions pose. These recommendations include the
following: first, separating business finances and personal assets; second,
incorporating arbitration clauses into contracts; third, obtaining appropriate
liability insurance; and, finally, implementing subjective business practices
by granting managers discretionary authority.
A. Incorporate to Separate Business and Personal Assets
One way for small business owners to minimize the impact of class
action lawsuits is to formally incorporate their business and separate their
personal assets from their business assets. Corporations and other statutorily
recognized entities-e.g., limited partnerships (LPs), limited liability
partnerships (LLPs), limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs) and
limited liability companies (LLCs)-all offer owners some degree of
protection from liabilities of the business, regardless of whether the
business is insolvent."' On the other hand, informal associations, such as
sole proprietorships and general partnerships, do not afford such protection;
the owners of such entities are personally responsible for all debts,
obligations and liabilities of the business.' In essence, formal
incorporation creates a limited liability shield for the personal assets of
shareholders. For small business owners, formal incorporation is an
inexpensive and simple way to protect personal assets and finances when
facing business litigation." 3 This will ensure that any financial losses
"' David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the
Limits ofLimited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1309-10 nn.1-5 (2007) (citing
various model codes offering limited liability).
112 See, e.g., Trs. of Amalgamated Ins. Fund v. Sheldon Hall Clothing, Inc., 862
F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he general rule [is] that a sole proprietor is
personally liable for all debts of the business; the proprietor's personal assets and
the proprietorship's business assets are legally a single financial estate."). For
liability of general partners, see UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 306 (1997) ("[A]ll partners [of
a general partnership] are liable jointly and severally for all obligations of the
partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law.").
3 How Small Businesses Owners Can Guard Against Class Action Lawsuits, BOLT
INS. AGENCY BLOG, http://www.boltinsurance.com/news/small-business-tips/how-
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associated with a potential lawsuit are less "astronomical" and, as such, the
financial gains for a victorious class of plaintiffs less significant.
Furthermore, the fewer assets a business possesses, the less attractive class
action litigation will appear to a group of plaintiffs.
In addition to incorporation, small business owners must be sure to
separate and avoid commingling their personal and business assets.
Although incorporation limits the liability of small business owners, it does
not shield them from the doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil."' 1 4 Veil
piercing is a creditor protection device that, under certain circumstances,
courts deploy to "pierce" the limited liability "veil" and extend liability
beyond the business to hold individual shareholders liable in tort or
contract."'5 Because of the nature of their businesses, private and
undercapitalized small business owners face a particularly high risk of veil
piercing.1 6 However, courts generally will employ the doctrine in these
cases only if there appears to be a "lack of separateness" between the
business owner and the business itself."'7 By separating personal and
business assets rather than commingling funds, small business owners can
ensure separateness and avoid the threats of a potential class seeking to
pierce the veil, which in turn, will reduce the potential harm associated with
small-businesses-owners-can-guard-against-class-action-lawsuits/ (last visited Mar.
30, 2013).
114 See Millon, supra note 111, at 1310-12.
1s WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN,
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BuSINESs ORGANIZATIONS 151 (Vicki
Been et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2009) ("The most frequently invoked-and radical-form
of shareholder liability in the cause of creditor protection is the equitable power of
the court to set aside the entity status . .. ('piercing the veil') to hold its
shareholders liable directly on contract and tort obligations."); see also Van Dom
Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[A]
corporate entity will be disregarded and the veil of limited liability pierced when
two requirements are met: [F]irst, there must be such unity of interest and
ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual [or
other corporation] no longer exist; and second, circumstances must be such that
adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or
promote injustice." (alteration in original) (quoting another source)); Millon, supra
note 111, at 1310.
116 ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN,supra note 115, at 152 ("A number of
factors may play a role in veil-piercing decisions: A disregard of corporate
formalities, thin capitalization, small numbers of shareholders, and active
involvement by shareholders in management are but a few."). Small business
owners are at higher risk because they will likely play an active role in the business
and because small businesses operate on less capital and with fewer owners.
11 See Van Dorn, 753 F.2d at 569-70 ("unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation and the individual ... no longer exist").
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class litigation."'8 Therefore, as a method of decreasing the potential
detrimental impact of class actions against small businesses, small business
owners should be sure to incorporate their business and separate all of their
personal assets and finances from their business assets and finances.
B. Incorporate Arbitration Agreements in Contracts
Arbitration clauses in employment contracts, investor contracts and
purchasing agreements may also help small businesses avoid class litigation
and the disadvantages class actions pose. In addition to Dukes, the Supreme
Court reached another landmark decision in 2011 when confronted with
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.119 The Court held that the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts state rules that purport to invalidate arbitration
agreements to waive class actions.120 Thus, small businesses can contract to
avoid litigating against classes and instead defend against classes in an
arbitral forum.12 ' The ability to arbitrate class claims is particularly
advantageous for undercapitalized small business defendants. When legal
disputes arise, arbitration offers a way for small businesses to save time and
money, and it can help protect the small business' reputation which could
otherwise be damaged by class litigation.122
Arbitration has several advantages over litigation. Arbitration is a
dispute resolution forum that allows small businesses to save time and
money.123 Unlike litigation, the procedure of arbitration is less formal and
parties need not go through the various pretrial steps involved in litigation,
which can be costly and drawn out.124 Also, the ability to draft a mandatory
arbitration clause is essentially a way for small businesses to exercise a
118 Among the factors courts consider when determining whether separateness
exists include the commingling of funds or assets. See, e.g., id. at 570.
"9 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
120 d. at 1748, 1753.
121 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) ("A written provision in. . . contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.").
122 See Chau, supra note 7, at 994.
123 See Theodore 0. Rogers, Jr., The Procedural Differences Between Litigating in
Court and Arbitration: Who Benefits?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 633, 639-40
(2001).
124 Id. ("There is no doubt that arbitration is faster on the whole than court ....
With fewer depositions and with faster pre-trial procedures, a proceeding tried to
judgment is much less costly in arbitration than in court.").
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degree of control over contractual disputes.125 One of the disadvantages that
class litigation poses to small businesses is that small businesses often do
not have the adequate financial resources to devote towards extensive
discovery.126 However, mandatory arbitration agreements can be drafted to
limit the scope of discovery, which will save small businesses time and
money and will protect them from the disadvantages of unequal bargaining
power.127 Furthermore, arbitration also offers parties the benefit of limited
judicial review.' 2 8 Arbitration decisions are generally final, thus avoiding
the additional cost of an appeal.129
Arbitration is also a way for small businesses to avoid harm to their
reputation.130 Unlike decisions in litigation, arbitration agreements can be
designed so that proceedings and final decisions remain confidential.131 As
discussed supra Part VI, the mere fact that a class action was filed can be
detrimental to a business' reputation-whether a business prevails in a class
125 So long as all parties sign, the drafters of arbitration agreements control how the
arbitration will function; moreover, mandatory arbitration agreements are generally
enforceable. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
126 See discussion infra Part VI.
127 Edward Brunet & Walter E. Stem, Drafting the Effective ADR Clause for
Natural Resources and Energy Contracts, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer
1996, at 7 ("The custom [arbitration] clause can describe whether any discovery is
permissible and, if so, the extent of discovery available.").
128 Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality Through
Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REv. 123, 126 (2002). Both the Federal Arbitration
Act and the Uniform Arbitration Act (which has been adopted by forty-nine states)
contain provisions limiting judicial review. Id. at 131, 154 n.163.
129 Id. at 133 ("Finality has been the functional cornerstone of arbitration, in that it
has allowed arbitration to develop as a private, flexible, and self-contained process
regarded as more efficient than litigation both in terms of time and expense."
(footnote omitted)).
130 Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L.
REv. 1211, 1224 (2006) ("[Alrbitration's private proceedings allow parties to
resolve their disputes quietly without suffering public embarrassment of
litigation." (footnote omitted)).
Schmitz, supra note 130, at 1215 ("Arbitration's private process limits its
transparency by precluding the public's observation of and participation in the
process." (footnote omitted)); id. at 1222 ("The press and the public may not freely
attend and observe arbitration hearings, and some parties agree to various levels of
secrecy. Furthermore, arbitration fosters a culture of secrecy that participants often
observe even when they do not sign confidentiality agreements."); see also
Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use)
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 433, 452 (2010)
("[A]rbitration may better protect confidential information from disclosure.");
Lynne MacDonald, What Are the Benefits ofEmployment Arbitration?, Hous.
CHRON., http://smallbusiness.chron.com/benefits-employment-arbitration-
14693.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) ("Unlike court actions, arbitration
proceedings and arbitrators' decisions are not normally made public.").
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action suit. By incorporating an arbitration clause with a confidentiality
provision, small businesses can protect their reputation from the damaging
effects of litigation.132
In short, the inclusion of an arbitration clause in business contracts
provides a safety net for small businesses that would otherwise fall into the
potentially devastating pit of class action litigation. Unlike litigation,
arbitration offers small businesses the benefits of saving time and money,
limiting discovery and avoiding permanent damages to their reputation.
C. Invest in Appropriate Liability Insurance
Small businesses can also protect themselves from class actions by
investing in appropriate liability insurance, the requirements of which will
vary by state.133 Businesses-like individuals-often purchase some type of
general or business basic liability insurance. This insurance protects small
businesses against personal accidents, bodily injuries inflicted on third
parties and property damages. 134 Business basic liability insurance is
included in most businesses owner policy (BOP) packages.135 However,
although basic liability coverage may be economically feasible, BOP
packages are designed for low-risk businesses and do not provide coverage
for professional errors or negligence, workplace misconduct and other
potential damages that could result in a class action law suit.136 Depending
on the type of business, general liability insurance alone may not
adequately protect against class actions.
In regard to consumer class actions, the type of liability insurance that
will provide adequate protection will depend on the type of business.
Businesses that render professional services will not be afforded much
protection under a general policy and should consider purchasing a
professional liability insurance policy.137 Unlike most traditional policies, a
professional liability policy provides protection for malpractice and other
132 See Schmitz, supra note 130.
'3 Business Insurance, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/content/
business-insurance (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) ("Most states require businesses
with employees to pay for workers' compensation insurance, unemployment
insurance, and state disability insurance.").
134 SHEL PERKINS, TALENT IS NOT ENOUGH: BUSINESS SECRETS FOR DESIGNERS
188-89 (Michael J. Nolan et. al eds., 2d ed. 2010); 13 Types ofInsurance a Small
Business Owner Should Have, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/thesba/2012/01/19/13-types-of-insurance-a-small-business-owner-should-
have/ [hereinafter FORBES]; Business Insurance, supra note 133.
13 PERKINS, supra note 134, at 188.
Id.; see also L. Kathleen Chaney, Employment Practices Liability Insurance, 30
COLO. LAW. 125, 125 (2001); FORBES, supra note 134.
1 FORBES, supra note 134..
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damages for improper services. 138 On the other hand, businesses that
operate in the chain of product distribution should consider product liability
insurance, which will provide coverage in the event that the business is
sued by consumers of defective products.13 9
In addition, traditional insurance policies often do not provide coverage
for employment rights violations. 14 0 Like the class action in Dukes, many
employment actions are brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act
or Age Discrimination in Employment Act.14 1 Unlike many traditional
policies, employment practices liability insurance (EPLI) offers protection
for businesses sued for wrongful employment practices, "such as wrongful
termination, discrimination, and sexual harassment."l4 2 Thus, small
business owners with a significant number of employees should consider
investing in an EPLI policy so that their businesses are protected against
potential employee class actions.
In sum, there are a number of insurance policies available that will
afford protection against class actions and litigation in general. However,
businesses must be sure to invest in the appropriate policy or combination
of policies that best suit their operation in order to be adequately protected.
D. Attempt to Engage in Subjective Practices
Finally, a less feasible recommendation for small businesses to avoid
class action litigation is to engage in completely subjective employment
practices. By doing so, it will be more difficult for prospective class
representatives to satisfy the commonality requirement, causing the class
action to dissolve at the certification stage.143 The heightened commonality
requirement from Dukes will likely be of minimal assistance to small
businesses. Unlike Wal-Mart and other large corporations, small businesses
cover a relatively small geographical scope and employ only a few
managers, if any. As a result, small businesses are likely unable to
designate discretionary authority to managers and successfully challenge
commonality.1" However, if courts continue to narrow the gap for class
138 See id.
139 Types ofBusiness Insurance, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/
content/types-business-insurance (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
140 Chaney, supra note 136.
141 id.
142 id.
143 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
'" In holding that commonality was lacking, the Court in Dukes stated that "[i]n a
company of Wal-Mart's size and geographical scope, it is quite unbelievable that
all managers would exercise their discretion in a common way without some
common direction." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555 (2011).
However, small businesses likely do not cover the same geographical scope and do
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actions to squeeze through, the successful implementation of subjective
practices and policies among the few managers and within the actual
business premises may be just enough for small businesses to disprove
commonality.
IX. CONCLUSION
The degree of harm that Dukes will have on small businesses remains
uncertain. However, what appears certain is that Dukes was a victory for
large corporations but not for small businesses. The new "common answer"
prong of the commonality prerequisite has made it more difficult to show
commonality in cases where the employer is large with local managerial
discretionary authority and subjective employment practices. Also, the
Court's decision to require prospective classes with claims for monetary
relief to obtain certification under Rule 23(b)(3) serves as an advantage for
large corporations because of the significant burden that the Rule 23(b)(3)
notice requirement places on large classes.
The same cannot be said for small businesses, however. First, the
heightened commonality requirement will be easier to satisfy when class
actions are brought against small businesses. Because smaller businesses do
not cover a large geographical scope, do not have many local managers
with discretionary authority and do not face giant class sizes in litigation, it
will be more likely that prospective class members will have consistent
common questions with common answers. Furthermore, the Court's
decision to bar Rule 23(b)(2) certification for classes seeking individualized
monetary claims also provides no advantage to smaller businesses. The
burden it places on plaintiffs in class actions against large corporations does
not exist when class actions are brought against small businesses because
prospective class sizes (and consequently the burden to notify) will be
much smaller. Overall, small business owners must take it upon themselves
to guard against class actions.
not employ a significant number of managers, making it more difficult to disprove
commonality.
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